

## **Evaluation of United Nations Development Programme Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme**

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Coventry, January 2012**



FSD Mine Detection Dog and Handler, Tajik-Afghan Border, December 2011

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## **Executive Summary**

The evaluation of the Support to Tajikistan Mine Action Programme (STMAP) was commissioned by UNDP to:

- Develop a roadmap for the future of TMAC
- Review the progress of STMAP against the goals of CPAP, UNDAF 2010-2015 and the national mine action strategy 2010-2015

The evaluation was conducted over a month and involved document review and a two week field visit to Tajikistan to interview TMAC staff and partners, and observe mine action activities.

TMAC was established in 2003 following an agreement between UNDP and the Government of Tajikistan (GoT). TMAC was intended to be a national body but, 8 years after it was created, it occupies an ambiguous position as it is neither a national project nor a directly implemented UNDP project. TMAC is responsible for coordinating and monitoring all mine action activities in Tajikistan.

The mine/ERW contamination is confined to three areas and, although there has been no detailed research to assess the impact of the contamination it appears that socio-economic impact is localized.

### **Conclusions**

- TMAC functions reasonably well, succeeds in coordinating and monitoring mine action activities at the implementation level and has achieved many of the goals outlined in the STMAP including:
  - Processes within operations have been clarified and procedures improved.
  - Clearance capacity has been increased.
  - IMSMA is in the process of being upgraded so it will be a more effective tool for planning and analysis of mine action activities.
  - MRE has been delivered through partners to groups at risk. SALW awareness training and gender issues are being incorporated into MRE
  - VA is provided primarily by identifying potential beneficiaries and sourcing appropriate, socio-economic, medical, psychosocial or financial support.

There is a general consensus among demining organizations that TMAC capacity has been enhanced and its procedures have been clarified in the last two years.

- However, it is failing to assert its authority over the development of strategic and operational plans for mine action. There was confusion among the mine action actors who or which organization was responsible for developing the various elements of the new strategic and operational mine action plans, how the development of these plans was being coordinated, and what stage had been reached in the development of these plans and when they would be completed.
- The ambiguous status of TMAC means that it operates on goodwill and the ways in which it can be funded are affected. For example, donors that might fund a national project are unable to fund TMAC.

- TMAC's ambiguous status means that its ability to operate is vulnerable to changing conditions and possible breakdown in working relationships.
- TMAC has good working relations with most of its implementing partners, but outside this mine action network, it has a low profile and is failing to draw on existing external resources to support its activities.
- Staff are committed and work hard to achieve their STMAP goals. However, with more effective leadership to help staff maximize the impact of their work and identify different ways of achieving their goals, TMAC could achieve more and more quickly. For example, communication with a wider range of organizations to raise awareness about TMAC's work and identify opportunities for mainstreaming mine action activities.
- There is a perception among other actors that TMAC's role is confused and that there is not a clear division between monitoring and coordination, and implementation. UNDP should take steps to ensure that TMAC does not have conflicts of interest, and that its role is focused on monitoring and coordination. At the implementation level, TMAC staff (MRE and VA officers in particular) should ensure that they do not become personally involved in implementation. Guidance may be necessary to help staff understand the difference between monitoring and coordination, and implementation which, at the point of delivery, can be subtle. UNDP should monitor this situation.
- The lack of progress towards nationalization and the creation of a national capacity for mine action as stated in the aims of STMAP is a significant failing. However, there are many factors affecting these processes that are beyond the control of TMAC and UNDP.
- Although the GoT has signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), the lack of a nationalized mine action centre and exclusion of mine action from the PRSP seems to demonstrate a lack of willingness on the part of the GoT to assume responsibility for mine action.
- With possibly only four years before clearance is completed, TMAC and UNDP need to develop an exit strategy and plans for creating a sustainable national mine action capacity as retaining TMAC in its current form with its current activities can not be justified once clearance has been completed. Although Tajikistan has until 2020 to complete clearance, mine action should be conducted as efficiently as possible.

#### **Key Recommendations**

- Appoint an international programme manager.
- Determine the status of TMAC until 2015. If TMAC's status is to be changed, develop a strategy towards achieving this status in early 2012 and implement according to an agreed schedule.
- Develop an exit strategy.

The appointment of an international programme manager is strongly recommended to:

- raise the profile of TMAC, particularly among non-mine action actors and international actors working in Tajikistan.
- assert TMAC's authority over mine action activities and act as the lead organization for developing strategies and work plans.
- improve resource mobilization and access expertise/resources from national/international actors operating in Tajikistan.
- review TMAC staffing levels and roles and responsibilities.

- provide clear direction to staff and help staff to see how they can improve their work..
- ensure that TMAC focuses on coordination and monitoring and is not involved in implementation.
- explore ways of mainstreaming mine action into other initiatives.
- develop an exit strategy which ensures that there is effective residual national capacity.
- organize regular meetings at national and local levels with relevant actors. Identify new actors that may gain from or have something to offer TMAC and mine action activities.
- ensure that staff capacity building and international travel are appropriate, benefit TMAC and help it to fulfil its objectives and do not detract from TMAC's important daily activities
- in consultation with UNDP, GoT, TMAC staff and other key actors develop and implement a plan to determine TMAC's status.

Although an international programme manager would be expensive, expected improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of TMAC would result in a more cost effective programme overall, and not necessarily greater total expenses. The programme manager would also be responsible for resource mobilization and, after an initial employment period, should assume responsibility for generating funding for the position.

If it is not possible to employ an international programme manager, it is recommended that UNDP provides oversight and assumes greater control of the following:

- Mainstreaming mine action activities, particularly MRE and VA into other national and international programmes.
- Coordinating of mine action at the strategic and policy level.
- Ensuring regular communication of mine action activities and issues at national, regional and local levels among a wide range of actors, not just TMAC partners.
- Assessing the appropriateness of international travel and capacity building and restrict if necessary.
- Ensuring that TMAC is focused on monitoring and coordination and is not involved in implementation.

As the UNDP Country Office in Tajikistan does not have technical expertise, as suggested in a previous evaluation, it should seek expert advice when necessary so that it can make informed decisions.

### **Specific Recommendations**

- TMAC should continue to work towards improving all areas of its operations and achieving STMAP goals.
- All strands of TMAC's operations should be developing an exit strategy.
- *Prioritization*: The procedure for prioritizing areas for clearance should be explained to implementing partners and revised if necessary. If there are no socio-economic reasons for clearance, prioritization should be based on the most effective and efficient way to use the technical resources available to complete clearance as quickly as possible.
- *CoES EOD Capacity*: in line with STMAP, TMAC must develop a strategy to support and use this capacity
- *IMSMA*: TMAC should continue to upgrade IMSMA and use the resources to inform mine action activities. IMSMA staff levels should be assessed to ensure that they are adequate
- *MRE*: examine how MRE can be mainstreamed into other activities, the network expanded and sustainable capacity developed. It is suggested that the possibility of integrating mine action into disaster risk reduction activities be explored. Support demining operators in their community liaison activities.

- *VA*: examine ways of mainstreaming MRE into initiatives aimed at supporting other vulnerable groups. Encourage advocacy through established (and not new) NGOs and civil society organizations
- *Communication*: in addition to organizing regular meetings, TMAC should create and maintain a proper website

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**Rebecca Roberts**

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## Acronyms

<b>BCPR</b>	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
<b>CIHL</b>	Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law
<b>CoES</b>	Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence
<b>CPAP</b>	Country Programme Action Plan
<b>CR</b>	Central Region
<b>CWFA</b>	Committee of Women and Family Affairs
<b>DRR</b>	Disaster Risk Reduction
<b>EOD</b>	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
<b>ERW</b>	Explosive Remnants of War
<b>FSD</b>	Foundation Suisse de Déminage
<b>GoT</b>	Government of Tajikistan
<b>HI</b>	Handicap International
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>IMAS</b>	International Mine Action Standards
<b>IMSMA</b>	Information Management System for Mine Action
<b>ICBL</b>	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
<b>KAP</b>	Knowledge, Attitude, Practice
<b>MBT</b>	Mine Ban Treaty
<b>MDD</b>	Mine Detection Dogs
<b>MoE</b>	Ministry of Education
<b>MoH</b>	Ministry of Health
<b>MRE</b>	Mine Risk Education
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>NMAS</b>	National Mine Action Standards
<b>NPA</b>	Norwegian People's Aid
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for security and Cooperation in Europe
<b>PRSP</b>	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
<b>RSCT</b>	Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan
<b>SOP</b>	Standard operating procedure
<b>TAB</b>	Tajik-Afghan Border
<b>TMAC</b>	Tajikistan Mine Action Centre
<b>TRCS</b>	Tajikistan Red Crescent Society
<b>TUB</b>	Tajik-Uzbek Border
<b>UNDAF</b>	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UST</b>	Union of Sappers of Tajikistan
<b>UXO</b>	Unexploded Ordinance
<b>VA</b>	Victim Assistance



# 1. Introduction

## **Purpose of Evaluation**

This report was commissioned by UNDP to assess the Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme (STMAP). The full ToR can be found in Annex 1, but following discussions with UNDP at the beginning of the field visit, it was agreed that the evaluation would focus on:

- Developing a roadmap for the future of TMAC
- Reviewing the progress of STMAP against the goals of CPAP, UNDAF 2010-2015 and the national mine action strategy 2010-2015

## *STMAP expected outputs*

- The capacity of TMAC to coordinate, plan, regulate and monitor mine action operations and activities is supported and reinforced
- Demining activities are conducted according to international mine action standards (IMAS) and national mine action standards (NMAS) under the coordination and supervision of TMAC
- Mine victims have proper access to adequate medical, rehabilitation and psycho-social support as well as to socio-economic assistance
- Mine risk education is provided to all mine-affected communities and groups

## *UNDAF Outcome*

- Disaster risk management capacities are enhanced to integrate improved environmental and water management
- Government capacity to plan, coordinate and implement mine action is supported to help ensure Tajikistan is compliant with the MBT

## *CPAP Outcome*

- Government is able to plan, coordinate and implement comprehensive mine action

The effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, impact and sustainability of TMAC projects are taken into consideration.

## **Methodology**

The evaluation was conducted over a month and included a document review (see annex 2 for documents consulted) and a two week visit from 1 to 14 December 2011 to Tajikistan. A series of meetings was conducted with key stakeholders in Dushanbe, and two field visits were made to Isfara district of the Soghd region in the North and the Khatlon region on the Tajik-Afghan border to meet partners, key stakeholders and members of mine- and ERW-affected areas (see annex 3 for a list of meetings).

Meetings were conducted using a free-flowing semi-structured interview methodology to encourage respondents to talk openly and draw attention to the issues they considered important. Such an approach limits the possibility of preconceptions prematurely narrowing the scope of the research and overlooking important issues. Where possible data gathered from one interview was triangulated through meetings with other respondents and document review. Where respondents were reluctant to elaborate on what they regarded as sensitive information, care has been taken to ensure that meanings were correctly understood, and to avoid connecting individuals with specific information contained in the report.

Observing TMAC staff and the Centre's partners closely for two weeks provided many insights into how TMAC operates and manages its working relationships. Information learned from observation has been used to support data gathered through interviews and document review.

### **Constraints**

A number of factors affected how many people could be consulted and the depth of the information that could be collected for this evaluation.

- There was a lack of readily available documentation, either because it was not easy to identify who might have it or establish whether such documentation might exist. There is a paucity of socio-economic studies and information so the impact of landmine and ERW contamination and mine action activities is difficult to judge.
- The visit to Tajikistan was brief so it not possible to meet with all relevant actors or explore issues in depth. Instead the evaluation concentrated on meeting a cross-section of partners and stakeholders at the national and district levels and gaining an overview of the response to landmine and ERW contamination in Tajikistan.
- Given the short timeframe it has not always been possible to verify independently which STMAP, CPAP and UNDAF goals were achieved or the quality of the activities. In some cases a review of progress is based on annual and quarterly reports and statements from TMAC staff.
- Potential respondents were either unavailable or available for only a limited period of time because the visit coincided with the 2011 Meeting of States Parties in Cambodia, and in the busy period at the end of year they were focused on report writing and developing annual plans.
- Poor weather conditions impeded travel and shortened both field visits.

### **Report Structure**

Executive summary: outlines the key issues and lists recommendations.

Chapter 1: provides a rationale for the evaluation and information on how it was conducted.

Chapter 2: describes mine action in Tajikistan, the main actors and the context in which mine action is taking place.

Chapter 3: analyses the achievements of TMAC and the mine action community and provides recommendations for improvements.

Chapter 4: outlines a roadmap for the future of TMAC.

## **2. Analysis: Mine Action in Tajikistan**

### **Country Profile**

Tajikistan has the lowest GDP in central Asia. The GoT has limited financial resources and capacity to deliver services, and is heavily reliant on the international community for funding, practical support and expertise. The limited economic opportunities mean that around 1.5 million of its 7.5 million population work abroad. Only 7% of the land is suitable for arable farming yet 73% of the population live in rural areas. There was a civil war from 1992 to 1997 and conflict in the central region in 2010. Some informed observers report that the situation in the country is still tense although an outbreak of large-scale violence is not expected because, in general, people are tired of fighting. Tajikistan has poor relations with its neighbour, Uzbekistan, and 3% of the two countries' shared border is yet to be delineated. To the South, there is a war in Afghanistan, and drug and people trafficking from Afghanistan into Tajikistan. The lack of economic opportunities, civil unrest and regional instability, pose a potential threat to Tajikistan's security.

### **Mine/ERW Threat**

In comparison with other mine- and ERW-affected countries, the contamination in Tajikistan is relatively small. Contamination from Landmines and ERW is found in three regions of Tajikistan:

- the Central Region (CR) as a result of the civil conflict from 1992 to 1997;
- the Tajik-Afghan Border (TAB) mined by the Russian Army between 1991 and 1998;
- and the Tajik-Uzbek Border (TUB) which was mined by Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2000.

Most of the Tajik-Afghan border and Central Region have been surveyed while the Uzbek border is currently being surveyed by FSD. At the time of writing (December 2011) no contamination had been found on the Tajik side of the border and there is already speculation that all mine areas on the TUB could be on the Uzbek side of the border. Parts of the Tajik-Uzbek border are yet to be delineated so there is the potential for dispute regarding the exact location of the landmine contamination. Civilians living in the area simply report contaminated areas and landmine incidents as occurring in the border area.

The countrywide survey undertaken by FSD between 2003 and 2005 calculated that around 50Km<sup>2</sup> of land was contaminated with mines and UXO. Since then, through technical and non-technical survey, and clearance, the known dangerous areas has been reduced to just over 9.1km<sup>2</sup> by the end of 2011. If parts of the TUB are found to be mined, this would be in addition to the 9.1km<sup>2</sup> of identified dangerous areas.

In 2010 4 people were killed and 6 injured, ( 3 of the injured were deminers), and in 2011 2 people were killed and 4 injured. Up to the end of 2011, there had been a total of 834 known casualties (364 killed, 470 injured).

It is reported that economic necessity forces people into contaminated areas to undertake activities such as collecting firewood, and tending crops and livestock. However, to date no detailed impact assessment has been conducted so the level of socio-economic impact is unknown. A KAP survey conducted by HI in 2010 in 3 districts in the Sughd region concluded that the majority of the people were aware of the contamination and avoided dangerous areas. The main losses were livestock, which is a significant economic loss. However, shepherds and those crossing the border illegally to avoid the charges at legal border crossings were recognized as putting themselves at risk. Newcomers to the area, or people

who did not visit contaminated areas very often and were unfamiliar with them were also considered to be at risk.

### **Obligations to the Mine Ban Treaty**

The Republic of Tajikistan became a State Party of the MBT in April 2000; this required it to clear all mined areas by 1 April 2020. However, the country failed to meet its obligations to Article 5 within 10 years of becoming a signatory so applied for a 10 year extension in April 2010. Since the application for the 10 year extension, clearance capacity has significantly increased and it is widely believed among mine action actors that clearance of known contaminated areas could be completed by the end of 2015 or sooner.<sup>1</sup> If additional areas of Tajikistan are found to be contaminated with mines or ERW, the GoT is obligated to clear the land but not within the current agreed timeframe.

### **Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC)**

UNDP Tajikistan, following agreement with the Government of Tajikistan (GoT) established TMAC in 2003 with the intention that it should become a nationally owned programme in the near future. It is the executive body of CIIHL to which it reports and from which it requests permission for its activities. CIIHL acts as the National Mine Action Authority and is supposed to mainstream mine action into government socio-economic development plans. It is an inter-ministerial committee located in the Office of the President and, until his death in 2011, was chaired by the First Vice Prime Minister. At the time of the evaluation (December 2011) the acting chair of the committee was the Minister of Justice. Uncertainty about the long-term leadership of the committee has led to delays in decisions regarding TMAC activities.

TMAC is responsible for coordinating and monitoring all mine action activities in Tajikistan and develops the national mine action plan and standards, tasks operations and presents certificates to local authorities. In 2006, a national mine action strategy for 2006-2010 was formulated and approved by the government, and a new mine action strategy was developed in 2009-2010 for 2010-15 and approved in May 2011.

In addition to demining, MRE and victim assistance, TMAC is actively involved in advocacy and continues to promote Tajikistan's obligations to the MBT, and raises awareness about closely related issues, including lobbying the GoT to sign both the ban on the use of cluster munitions and the convention on the rights of persons with disabilities. TMAC staff attend international and national meetings on mine action and related issues. TMAC staff have also received training and capacity building in Tajikistan and abroad.

TMAC was established as a nationally implemented project but has never been nationalized. There have been no international staff at TMAC since 2008. Eight years after it was created, TMAC has an ambiguous status as it is neither a directly implemented UNDP project nor a nationally implemented project. Although in practice TMAC operates reasonably well and implementing partners are not directly affected by the Centre's ambiguous status, the situation needs to be addressed because:

- UNDP HQ wants UNDP Tajikistan to clarify TMAC status
- the UNDP mandate stipulates that projects should be nationalized as soon as possible in countries where there is a functioning government

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<sup>1</sup> OSCE estimates for completing clearance differ from other demining organizations. It argues that the difficulty in accessing some areas of the country mean that clearance could take another 20 years. However, all other technical experts in Tajikistan dispute this claim.

- UNDP Tajikistan's core funding is being cut, so funds will be available only for core activities falling within the mandate and strategies of UNDP, therefore there is a risk that, because of its ambiguous status, TMAC may not fall within the core strategies of the UNDP Country Office
- TMAC does not have legitimate authority, and is able to operate as a 'quasigovernmental' authority only because there is good will, and staff members have well-established networks
- Some donors willing to support national MA authorities cannot fund TMAC or its operations because it is not a national agency.
- TMAC cannot have a bank account because it is not a national project, therefore, funding for mine action from donors cannot be channelled through TMAC - this has created misunderstandings between donors and TMAC
- The GoT has signed the MBT and should demonstrate its commitment to the international community by complying with the terms of the Treaty. Without a nationalized mine action centre and mainstreaming of mine action into strategies such as Tajikistan's poverty reduction strategy paper, the GoT's commitment to mine action seems weak.

To clarify its status, TMAC could continue to operate as it is, be a directly implemented programme or be a nationally implemented programme.

#### *Directly implemented programme*

Although in reality TMAC is a directly implemented programme, clarifying its status as such would be difficult as it goes against UNDP's mandate and would be regarded as a backward step. Furthermore, as the initial agreement with the GoT envisaged TMAC as a national programme, to acknowledge officially TMAC as a directly implemented UNDP project, would require GoT consent.

#### *Nationally implemented programme*

Currently there is no agency within the GoT system that is responsible for mine action. For TMAC to be nationally implemented as it is, or for a completely new mine action agency to be created, the GoT must identify an existing agency or create a new one to manage mine action. If nationalization goes ahead, it requires the agreement of the government and in the past, the GoT has rejected requests to nationalize TMAC. It is believed that the request was refused by the Ministry of Finance because of the potential costs of assuming responsibility for mine action.

UNDP argues that funding could be found through a number of international donors for TMAC as a national programme to ease some/most of the financial burden on GoT, and maintain TMAC staff wages on a similar level to their UNDP staff salaries.

#### *Current situation*

Although in practice this is the easiest option, financially it is problematic to argue the case for maintaining TMAC's ambiguous status because UNDP core funds are being cut so UNDP must reassess its financial commitments; international donors are unable or unwilling to fund TMAC because it is not a national programme. TMAC operates on good will, because it does not have the authority of a national programme, therefore, if for some reason this good will is damaged, TMAC could find it difficult to fulfil its duties.

TMAC is neither independent of nor fully controlled by UNDP although UNDP has oversight of TMAC finances, human resources, procurement and international travel. Without access

to technical expertise, the UNDP Country Office is unable to make informed decisions about TMAC strategies and activities.

When mine/ERW clearance is complete, the official handover of the land is managed by TMAC acting on the authority of the GoT. If, following handover there is a mine/ERW accident, because of TMAC's ambiguous status, UNDP's lead role in mine action, and the GoT's reluctance to assume significant responsibilities for mine action, it is unclear which authority would be held responsible..

### **Mine Action Actors**

TMAC works with a number of partners including:

#### *Foundation Suisse de Déminage (FSD)*

FSD has been working in Tajikistan since 2004 following an agreement with the GoT.

#### *Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)*

NPA began working in Tajikistan in November 2010 after signing an MoU with the GoT government. NPA partners the National Guard.

#### *Union of Sappers of Tajikistan (UST)*

The UST is funded by the OSCE and comprises former MoD engineers working under an MoU with the MoD as part of the MoD's Humanitarian Demining Unit.

#### *OSCE*

Has provided funding for mine action, assisted in establishing the USD and assumed a lead role in developing the strategic plan for 2012-2015 for demining operations.

#### *HI*

HI funded and conducted the KAP survey in 2010 and at the end of 2011 funded consultants with expertise in disabilities, victim assistance and mine risk education, and also assisted in the development of strategic plans for VA and MRE for 2012-2015.

#### *ICRC*

In contaminated areas, ICRC has worked with the district/sub-district governments and schools to provide safe play grounds. It also provided support to MRE and VA.

#### *Tajikistan Red Crescent Society (TRCS)*

Through a network of volunteers TRCS provides MRE.

#### *UNICEF*

UNICEF conducted MRE in schools until 2008 when responsibility was handed over to UNDP. Before withdrawing from delivering MRE, UNICEF provided MRE materials which are used in schools, and trained trainers in cooperation with the Ministry of Education in an effort to create a sustainable MRE resource.

#### *Cooperation and Mainstreaming*

In addition to partners, TMAC cooperates with other organizations to extend MRE, conduct advocacy activities, and provide support to mine victims, their families and vulnerable groups in contaminated areas. Local and national media are used to raise awareness about the dangers of landmines and ERW. A number of local NGOs are involved in lobbying the

GoT to become a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and efforts are made to mainstream mine action into development activities such as those initiated by the UNDP Communities project.

#### *GoT*

TMAC also works with the GoT at the national, regional, district and sub district level. Through schools, the Ministry of Education is involved in the delivery of MRE which is part of the official curriculum, although the attention given to MRE in individual schools is determined by each school's director. The Ministries of Health, and Labour and Social Protection are involved in providing medical care and rehabilitation for mine victims, and socio-economic support to mine victims, their families, and other vulnerable groups affected by landmine and ERW contamination. The National Orthopaedic Centre provides prosthetic limbs for mine victims.

Limited resources mean that, although ministries are involved in mine action, the funding for their activities comes from the international community. For example, the European Union funds the National Orthopaedic Centre. Therefore, the GoT contributes to mine action in kind. Through the MoD, deminers are recruited and trained from among conscripted soldiers. During mine clearance operations, the district government helps to secure accommodation for the deminers and their support staff. TMAC estimates that in the last year the GoT has contributed around 700,000 USD in kind, which is 100,000 USD more than suggested in STMAP.

According to STMAP, TMAC is also responsible for providing on-the-job training for an EOD unit established within the Committee for Emergency Situations. The EOD unit was created to ensure national capacity to deal with any residual mine and EOD contamination once the main mine action operation had been completed. The funding and resources were provided by UNDP.

#### **Funding for Mine Action**

Funding for mine action in Tajikistan comes from a number of sources to fund TMAC and/or implementing partners or other mine action actors.

Since its inception, UNDP has provided around 300,000 USD/year from its core grant for TMAC to coordinate and manage mine action. Additional funds are sometimes available from external donors for implementation activities such as mine clearance, victim assistance, MRE. For example, DFAIT gives 1/2 a million USD and UNDP BCPR contributes between 150,000 and 200,000 USD annually and up to 1 million USD for 2012-2013. UNDP on behalf of TMAC submits funding proposals. TMAC staff have a high level of ownership and also submit funding proposals although, theoretically, TMAC should submit proposals through UNDP and not directly to donors. Such proposals are aimed not only to secure funds for TMAC activities but to support national mine action activities.

Among the donors to mine action in Tajikistan have been DFAIT, DFID, France, Germany, Japan and OSCE. Between 2008 and 2010 DFID funds were received through UNDP BCPR. Only DFAIT provides funds directly to UNDP Tajikistan.

### 3. Analysis: Progress of STMAP

Drawing on document review, interviews with national and international stakeholders and observations made during the field visit to Tajikistan, this section provides an overview of progress against the goals of STMAP, CPAP, UNDAF and recommendations from a previous evaluation. The analysis highlights key areas of success or areas where performance could be improved.

#### **Overview**

Despite its ambiguous status, TMAC functions. It succeeds in coordinating mine action activities and maintaining a network of implementing partners. In 2010 TMAC achieved most of its STMAP goals and the same situation is likely to be confirmed for 2011 when the annual report is submitted. Overall its staff are committed and feel a strong sense of ownership for the project. However, there is room for improvement, and the potential to implement mine action more effectively and efficiently to maximize impact. TMAC needs to adopt a higher profile and assert its authority over mine action in Tajikistan ensuring that it takes the lead in coordinating activities and developing strategies and operational plans. TMAC's role is to coordinate and monitor, yet the lines between implementing and coordination are sometimes blurred. To be accountable and transparent, TMAC needs to ensure that there is no conflict of interests and that it is overseeing other organizations implementing mine action activities and not implementing activities itself. Despite being stated STMAP goals, the amount of time spent on capacity building, attending high level and international meetings and advocacy work, detracts from important daily activities and a focus on work with more tangible outputs.

Within Tajikistan, networking outside the immediate mine action organizations could be improved, particularly among international organizations working at the community level. There is also a need for greater outreach among mine action and non-mine action organizations. Many actors felt that TMAC did not host enough meetings with implementing organizations, and suggested that quarterly meetings open to organizations working in mine action or in areas contaminated by landmines and UXO, would be useful for communicating TMAC plans, raising awareness about the potential contamination threat and providing opportunities for mainstreaming mine action into broader development initiatives.

Currently staff have a narrow perspective of their roles and have the capacity to make a much fuller contribution if they were more aware of the overall strategy of the organization and had a greater understanding of how their different activities could complement and contribute to each other.

Given the probability that known contaminated areas can be cleared by the end of 2015, TMAC needs to start planning an exit strategy, establishing a small sustainable national demining capacity to clear residual contamination, and explore ways of mainstreaming MRE and victim assistance into other activities which will operate long-term.

#### **Demining operations**

##### *Efficiency*

In line with STMAP goals, capacity to undertake demining operations has increased and demining partners have noted improvements in TMAC's capacity to manage demining operations. In particular, the new system for land release introduced in 2011 is clear and seems to be working well. The upgrading of the IMSMA enables the size of the area



identified as dangerous to be plotted against the size of the area found to be contaminated during clearance, to judge whether systems such as land release and area reduction are efficient. Initial findings suggest that clearance is becoming more efficient. This is significant as clearance is time consuming and expensive so efficient use of resources is important.

The introduction of digital survey and mapping equipment and techniques in the last two years has facilitated tasking, clearance and record keeping. In 2012 all demining organizations will have the necessary equipment for digital mapping. This increases the speed at which certain aspects of demining operations can be undertaken, improves accuracy, and facilitates data input to IMSMA.

TMAC should continue to monitor the efficiency of clearance operations to make further improvements if possible. TMAC should also work closely with demining organizations. Working relationships with NPA and FSD are good and both organizations have expressed a willingness to assist TMAC further when and where possible. Relationships with OSCE are strained and, although it is unclear how this affects work with UST, TMAC should make efforts to improve its relationship with OSCE so it is as effective and productive as its relationships with FSD and NPA.

#### *Prioritization*

Although TMAC staff report that there is a prioritization procedure for the allocation of clearance tasks, demining partners are unclear of the procedure. To resolve this confusion, TMAC should meet with demining partners to explain the prioritization procedure. Following the explanation, if shortcomings in the procedure are identified, these should be discussed among all partners and a revised procedure agreed.

As there is limited available data on the socio-economic impact of contaminated land, and it is known that some contaminated areas have limited impact on the population (for example, on the TAB, because the area is under military control and access to civilians denied), demining partners should consider prioritization based on what is technically the most efficient approach, with the aim of completing clearance as soon as possible. If, at a later date, there is evidence that particular contaminated areas have a socio-economic impact, the prioritization strategy can be revised.

#### *Tasking, Monitoring and QA*

Demining organizations felt that IMAS had been integrated into NMAS and that TMAC staff had the necessary skills to ensure QC and QA. However, it was felt that a lack of operations staff slowed down some activities. For example, if it is several weeks before cleared land is QA'd, vegetation re-grows and then has to be cleared again before QA can take place. This creates unnecessary additional work but also delays the official handover of the land to the local government.

#### *IMSMA*

During 2011, in collaboration with GICHD, significant efforts have been made to update and improve IMSMA. In addition to upgrading the software, new procedures for area reduction, tasking and land release have been incorporated into IMSMA. This has also involved training staff from implementing organizations in the new systems, which has been time consuming for the IMSMA officer.

In 2012 there are plans to integrate MRE and VA data into IMSMA which will facilitate planning and analysis of mine action activities in Tajikistan.

There is a general consensus that IMSMA is well managed and that significant improvements have been made to the database in the last two years. However, there is a backlog of data entry because the senior IMSMA officer was not in post and was replaced temporarily by a junior staff member; new data is being incorporated into the database; and the software upgrade has delayed routine IMSMA data entry (which is being managed externally so the schedule is beyond the control of TMAC). Additional capacity may be required to update IMSMA. Furthermore, TMAC has only one member of staff with the necessary skills to manage IMSMA and, although an IMSMA assistant was being trained, restructuring means that this person may not have the time to develop adequate skills to work with IMSMA independently. Without some flexibility in staffing for IMSMA, TMAC data management is vulnerable and the IMSMA officer has limited time for training field staff in data collection. It is important, therefore, that TMAC provides additional IMSMA capacity.

#### *CoES EOD Capacity*

An EOD capacity in CoES has been developed to enable Tajikistan to deal with residual contamination once the known landmine ERW threat has tackled. While this is an important step towards ensuring that Tajikistan has appropriate national capacity to deal with residual contamination, it does not appear that the EOD team is operating and it is not clear whether staff are maintaining the necessary accreditation. According to STMAP, TMAC is responsible for ensuring that it monitors the national EOD capacity and provides appropriate on-the-job training. Currently this is not happening, so there is a risk that this national capacity will be lost. Given the time and resources that have been invested, TMAC should review the situation and see whether this EOD capacity can be integrated into ongoing mine action operations.

#### **Mine Risk Education**

TMAC conducts MRE enthusiastically and there is a great deal of effort to maintain the network for MRE. According to the 2010 annual report and draft documentation for the 2011 annual report, most STMAP goals will be reached. However, STMAP has limited scope and there is potential to maximise the impact of MRE using current TMAC capacity:

- TMAC should coordinate and monitor MRE - at times TMAC seems to become involved in the implementation of MRE activities
- TMAC should be proactive in extending its MRE network among organizations working at the community level in Tajikistan. It is evident that development NGOS (particularly international NGOs) are sometimes unaware that they are working in contaminated areas, that information about the mine/ERW risk is available and that MRE can be provided
- There are no regular MRE meetings at the national or district/sub-district level. Quarterly meetings should be held to coordinate MRE and exchange information at the national level and local level in contaminated areas
- Community liaison support should be provided to demining organizations in the field to facilitate communications with the local population. The relatively small scale of demining operations in Tajikistan means that demining organizations do not have full community liaison capacity, although efforts are made to contact local authorities and inform communities of their activities. In addition, TMAC makes official contact with local authorities to inform them of mine action activities in the areas. However, in contaminated areas, TMAC should already have an established MRE network so it can be mobilized to facilitate community liaison for clearance operations relatively easily
- MRE messages and techniques do not seem to have changed significantly in the last few years so they should be reviewed to ensure that they are relevant and delivered in the most effective way

- TMAC must start to plan an exit strategy to develop a sustainable MRE capacity. It is recommended that TMAC explores the possibility of mainstreaming MRE into DRR education. TMAC should also review the capacity of existing MRE delivery through the MoE and schools, and RCST, to ensure that their capacity is sustainable and that current MRE is delivered according to best practice
- TMAC should work closely with the consultant hired by HI to develop the action plan for MRE

### **Victim Assistance**

As a review of victim assistance in Tajikistan in 2010 noted, the disability sector lacks the capacity to address adequately the needs of persons with disabilities, assistance for mine victims must be mainstreamed into assistance for persons with disabilities, and that it is beyond the scope of STMAP and the capacity of TMAC to upgrade the medical and rehabilitation services available in Tajikistan. The national orthopaedic centre which represents the national capacity to rehabilitate mine victims, is under resourced and understaffed. Staff are not trained to a high level; three people are undergoing training in Vietnam but will not return to Tajikistan for three years. TMAC was successful in identifying the funding for this training. Although obligated to work in government institutions for three years, wages are low, and there is no guarantee that trained staff can be retained. Former trained employees left the orthopaedic centre and it is assumed that low wages were a significant factor in this loss of labour. The three satellite clinics, scattered around Tajikistan and designed to offer support to mine victims and undertake remedial repairs of prosthetic limbs, are not functioning. Therefore, to receive assistance, mine victims must travel to Dushanbe. Theoretically, there is financial support for mine victims and their relatives to cover travel, accommodation and subsistence costs while in Dushanbe receiving treatment, however, it was not possible to verify this independently. Unofficial reports suggest that it is difficult for mine victims (and other people with disabilities) to access services without paying.

In addition to facilitating medical treatment, psychosocial support has been introduced in line with STMAP, and vocational training and income generation opportunities are also offered to victims.

Despite the lack of resources in Tajikistan, TMAC's victim assistance activities have achieved many of their goals in the last two years, but there is room for improvement and greater efficiency.

- TMAC should ensure that it is focused on coordinating and monitoring victim assistance and is not involved with implementation. If it is simply a matter of perception and external actors mistakenly believe that TMAC is involved in implementation, it is necessary to understand why this perception exists and work towards communicating accurate information about TMAC's role.
- The capacity of a new advocacy NGO which has received support from UNDP and TMAC is extremely limited and it is unlikely that it would be able to fulfil its intended role in the near future. There are existing NGOs advocating for the rights of the disabled in Tajikistan and these already have the capacity to undertake advocacy for mine victims and their activities are more likely to be sustainable than those of a new NGO. Advocacy for mine victims would be more effective if UNDP/TMAC explore the possibilities of integrating this new NGO or its activities with another NGOs and their activities.

- Rehabilitation and medical treatment in Tajikistan for victims is provided through the Ministry of Health. TMAC is involved in sourcing funding for VA activities, however, as the in-country capacity is limited, TMAC should consider whether better support could be found and funded elsewhere in the region.
- Victim assistance should continue to be considered in broad terms and include socio-economic help, psychosocial support as well as medical treatment. However, as proposed in STMAP, victim assistance should be mainstreamed into support for the disabled and other vulnerable groups.
- Data from a needs assessment conducted in 2011 should be analysed and used to inform support for victims. TMAC should share the findings with other relevant actors.
- TMAC should organize regular meetings at the national level and local levels in contaminated areas to coordinate victim assistance, and mainstream support to victims, their families and other vulnerable groups.
- Psychosocial support is confined to summer camps for landmine victims. Efforts should be made to mainstream this into psychosocial support for people with disabilities.
- TMAC should develop an exit strategy for victim assistance. This process would be facilitated if activities to support mine victims are mainstreamed into other initiatives and if meetings with relevant actors are held regularly.
- TMAC should work closely with the consultant hired by HI to develop the action plan for victim assistance.

### **Crosscutting Issues**

#### *Planning and coordination*

TMAC does not have a high profile in the international community and it is not asserting its leadership role of mine action in Tajikistan, or coordinating activities and actors as effectively as it might. This is partly because of personal and political dynamics, the lack of a coherent strategy that draws together the various strands of mine action and uses the full range of expertise and resources among national and international NGOs, and the lack of a clear understanding of the difference between monitoring/coordination and implementation.

TMAC is not leading or coordinating the development of a new mine action strategy and action plans effectively. There is confusion among actors about which organizations are responsible for the development of these plans and what progress has been made. Consultants hired by HI to develop action plans for MRE and VA in Tajikistan had no formal agreement to work with TMAC staff. It is unclear how such a situation arose, but if TMAC were providing effective leadership it would not have happened. In addition, if external expertise is available, it should be used to support capacity development in TMAC and to work towards achieving STMAP goals. If such support is not deemed necessary, then TMAC needs to demonstrate that it already has the necessary capacity. Another area of confusion is the role of OSCE which seemed to have assumed responsibility for developing certain aspects of the mine action strategy and action plans. Neither nor other mine action organizations seemed to know exactly what OSCE was working on. If TMAC were asserting its leadership role, such a situation would not have arisen. It is acceptable for TMAC to delegate activities to willing partners but it must retain control of the situation and coordinate such work.

Although operations meetings are held weekly, meetings for actors involved in other aspects of mine action or working in mine/ERW contaminated areas are not held regularly. Communication of TMAC and mine action activities needs to be improved and TMAC needs

to develop knowledge of other initiatives which may benefit its own activities and its target population. In addition to regular meetings, TMAC needs to create and maintain a proper website as stated in STMAP.

Confusion over its role means that the division of responsibilities between TMAC and other actors is unclear. It also means that TMAC staff have less time to focus on coordination and developing effective strategies that draw on the resources of other organizations. For example, TMAC seems to be active in advocacy whereas focusing efforts on providing relevant information to organizations involved in advocacy would be more appropriate and create the basis for more sustainable advocacy.

TMAC does not seem to be working towards an exit strategy. With possibly less than four years of clearance remaining, it is imperative that TMAC begins to develop an exit strategy which makes provisions for mine action to continue in a sustainable manner on an appropriate scale. As the main body for coordination of mine activities in Tajikistan, TMAC is best placed to know how its activities can be scaled down and mainstreamed into the work of other government or non-government activities.

#### *Impact and Relevance*

Although TMAC and partners can determine whether countable STMAP goals have been achieved, the lack of baseline data and background information means that it is difficult to assess the relevance and impact of what has been achieved. TMAC admitted that it has not conducted any post-clearance socio-economic assessments as proposed in STMAP but, without pre-clearance socio-economic data, such an exercise would be meaningless. Ideally, given unlimited time and resources, background research would be conducted to develop a baseline against which to measure the socio-economic impact of mine action. Further KAP surveys would be conducted to inform MRE and development initiatives. However, given the remaining short lifespan of mine action and the many pressing development challenges facing Tajikistan, a more pragmatic approach would be appropriate. At this stage, large-scale research focused on mine action would not yield results quickly enough to have a significant impact on the planning and implementation of mine action. Instead, TMAC in consultation with other humanitarian, DRR and development actors should determine whether there is an effective way of mainstreaming research on the impact of mine clearance and mine action into broader research. For example, there are already established networks for disaster risk reduction (DRR) and research is conducted to facilitate the effective delivery of DRR so it would be possible to incorporate questions on mine risk and mine clearance.

#### *Capacity Building*

Although capacity building is important and staff should be encouraged to develop their skills and expertise, the amount of training seems disproportionate to TMAC's other activities and to the relatively short period remaining for TMAC to operate. Given limited resources and other pressing issues for TMAC staff to address, time and funding for capacity building should be used wisely. These activities should be closely monitored by UNDP.

#### *Gender*

Mine action actors are aware of the importance of gender mainstreaming and efforts are made to take into account the different needs of men and women, as well as the needs of other diverse groups. The pressures on men and women in Tajikistan are different. For example, men are generally regarded as the main household earner. Therefore, the majority of people working abroad are men, leaving women to head the household and undertake work that may traditionally have been done by men. Attitudes towards women differ in different

parts of the country. In the Rasht Valley, people are more conservative than in other areas and women are less likely to undertake work outside the home such as collecting firewood. In the north of the country, collecting firewood is regarded as work for women and girls.

Attitudes towards people with disabilities can be discriminatory, although disabilities that are the result of an accident rather than congenital, are less of a social stigma. Women with disabilities can find themselves 'doubly discriminated' against because they have a disability and are female.

Diverse attitudes mean that MRE and support to mine victims and people living in contaminated areas needs to be appropriately tailored. Targeted efforts to recruit female deminers have failed, although demining organizations have successfully employed female medics. Women are also involved in MRE and Victim Assistance and MRE trainers have been provided with training on gender through a series of workshop and provided with printed material to distribute. Within mine action, efforts are made to ensure that men and women have equal access to assistance.

Obviously mine action has to be conducted in a culturally sensitive manner, but within what is deemed socially acceptable, mine action organizations should continue their efforts to pursue a gendered approach.

#### **TMAC Evaluation 2009**

Many of the conclusions from this evaluation confirm the findings from a previous evaluation by Robert Keeley in 2009. There were efforts to implement some of his recommendations, all of which were included in STMAP including:

- the establishment of national EOD capacity in CoES to deal with the long-term residual mine and ERW, although further efforts are necessary to ensure that this capacity is sustainable
- increasing technical clearance capacity, therefore, in addition to FSD, NPA is now operating in Tajikistan
- land release procedures have been improved and strengthened
- a KAP survey has been conducted although it covered only a limited geographical area

However, certain recommendations are yet to be addressed or addressed effectively:

- securing access to technical expertise to support the UNDP Country Office staff in understanding and making informed decisions on technical aspects of TMAC work
- TMAC still seems to be too closely involved in implementing mine action activities rather than monitoring and evaluating activities implemented by other organizations.
- working relationships with OSCE seem to be poor
- TMAC still has an ambiguous status which means that working modalities between UNDP and TMAC are unclear
- there is still limited government ownership of mine action

#### **UNDAF and CPAP Outcomes**

Little progress has been made towards developing sustainable national capacity for mine action in Tajikistan as proposed in STMAP, and the GoT does not appear to be any closer to creating a national mine action centre than it was two years ago. The issue of national capacity and nationalization is discussed in the following chapter.

It is unclear how mine action is intended to contribute to or has been tailored to achieve outcome 4.3 of UNDAF: disaster risk management capacities are enhanced to integrate

improved environmental and water management. There is an argument that removing contamination increases access to natural resources and enables better environmental management but because of the small scale of the contamination and clearance the impact on environmental management will have been small. Effective EOD capacity in CoES would contribute to national disaster risk reduction capacity.

#### **UNDP Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme**

To date, UNDP support to mine action in Tajikistan has been appropriate and has been progressing towards preset goals. This is demonstrated by the fact that, with UNDP support, a mine action centre which has adequate capacity to coordinate and monitor the implementation of mine action activities, has been created. In line with STMAP goals, UNDP has encouraged and supported capacity building of TMAC staff over the last two years which mine action partner organizations report has improved the effectiveness and efficiency of TMAC, particularly activities related to clearance operations. Capacity in TMAC also exists to achieve the countable and more tangible outputs of STMAP.

Although Tajikistan faces many challenges, and the contamination posed by mine and ERW contamination is relatively small, as a signatory to the MBT, Tajikistan must fulfil its obligations to the Treaty. Therefore, UNDP is right to provide support to the GoT to fulfil its MBT obligations. Although, Tajikistan has until 2020 to complete clearance of all known contaminated areas, if clearance can be completed earlier, as most demining organizations argue, UNDP should pursue this matter with TMAC and other relevant organizations.

STMAP provides a satisfactory plan to enable Tajikistan to address the five pillars of mine action. However, the focus on tangible, countable outputs because they provide measurable indicators, means that the quality of what is delivered through STMAP is not assessed, and that there is not necessarily an incentive to achieve more than stipulated by STMAP.

The expected outputs for STMAP 2010-2012 are:

1. The capacity of TMAC to coordinates, plan, regulate and monitor mine action operations and activities is supported and reinforced.
- No progress towards nationalization has been made despite efforts. The death of the First Vice Prime Minister who chaired the CIIHL means that structures which may have supported and facilitated the creation of a national mine action centre/programme are in a state of flux. Ministries involved in mine action activities have limited capacity and receive external funding in order to function. Conclusions from this evaluation suggest that achieving nationalization will be difficult. The GoT should be encouraged to demonstrate a greater commitment to mine action at least through country development strategies and continued or increased contributions in kind. Possible roadmaps for the future of mine action/TMAC are discussed in the following chapter.
  - Training and capacity building means that TMAC has adequate capacity to coordinate and monitor mine action activities at the implementation level. However, UNDP retains oversight of TMAC finances, human resources, procurement and international travel. Given the findings of this evaluation, it is not recommended that UNDP relinquishes this power. At the senior management level there is a lack of leadership and TMAC is failing to assert its authority over mine action in Tajikistan. TMAC accounts are being independently audited as this should continue.

- TMAC and CIIHL represent Tajikistan mine action concerns at international meetings. Funding has been made available for this to happen and these organizations should continue to attend key meetings. However, such international fora are no more important than meetings held in Tajikistan. At a national level mine action is not being coordinated at a strategic and policy level. Beyond immediate partners other development actors and organizations operating in contaminated areas are not well acquainted with TMAC or mine action in Tajikistan.
- Progress towards the development of a new mine action strategy and action plans is chaotic and lacks leadership. There are political dynamics and personal tensions that have contributed to this situation, but stronger leadership for this process would have circumvented many of these challenges.
- IMSMA goals have almost been achieved, appropriate technical equipment and technical support have been provided. The IMSMA, VA and MRE officer have collaborating about how best to collect and enter VA and MRE data so that it can be used to inform mine action. The only obstacle now is the time needed to enter data which is dependent on one dedicated member of staff. If possible additional support for data entry and any other upgrading of the database should be sought.
- The TMAC website is not functional so little or no progress has been made towards this goal. The website is an important communication tool and should contain information about mine action activities in Tajikistan and a portfolio of mine action projects.

2. Demining activities are conducted according to international mine action standards (IMAS) and national mine action standards (NMAS) under the coordination and supervision of TMAC.

- Clearance rates of around 1.5km<sup>2</sup> per year are being achieved and demining organizations argue that with proper planning, clearance rates could be increase. The possibility of increasing clearance rates should be discussed among demining actors.
- Currently, the prioritization procedure is not understood outside TMAC. This issue should be addressed immediately.
- IMAS/NMAS and QA STMAP goals are considered by demining organizations to be adequately met but these are ongoing processes so these standards have to be maintained.
- Significant progress has been made towards agreeing and improving land release and technical survey methodologies. The achievement is the result of close cooperation among TMAC, The Survey Action Centre, FSD and NPA. The efficiency of these methodologies is being analysed using IMSMA which should help to identify additional improvements. All relevant actors were satisfied that they understood the methodologies and that they contributed to an improvement in demining operations.
- An EOD capacity was created in the CoES, but, at the end of 2011, it is unclear what its capacity is as the EoD team does not appear to be operational. UNDP should investigate the status of this capacity to see whether it needs additional resources to operate. TMAC is not fulfilling its role to use and provide on-the-job training to this EOD capacity, so the Centre must rectify this situation. The EOD team was created in CoES to ensure that Tajikistan had a sustainable capacity to deal with residual mine and ERW contamination. However, ways of maintainingg this capacity in the long-term have to be identified.

3. Mine victims have proper access to adequate medical, rehabilitation and psycho-social support as well as to socio-economic assistance.

- During the evaluation it was not possible to determine how well victim assistance was being mainstreamed into other UNDP/UN programmes or programmes implemented by other actors although documentation records that medical, rehabilitation treatment and



socio-economic support is provided through a number of organizations to mine/ERW victims. However, given that outside immediate mine action actors and TMAC partners there is little awareness of mine victims and communities living in/near mine areas, it is felt that there is room for strengthen the network of actors actively involved in victim assistance. Also, in the last two years, apart from advocacy meetings, no meetings focusing on VA at national or local levels seem to have been convened.

- In accordance with STMAP, an evaluation of victim assistance was conducted in 2010 and concluded that available medical/rehabilitation support in Tajikistan for people with disabilities is limited. It is beyond the capacity of the mine action community to meet the shortfall in appropriate assistance for mine/ERW victims but the need monitor, coordinate and source assistance is stressed.
  - There have been efforts to increase national capacity for victim assistance. Three people are currently receiving training in physiotherapy and rehabilitation in Vietnam. However, the three satellite clinics do not seem to be functioning and during the course of the evaluation, it was no possible to find anyone who had any detailed information about these clinics. It should be a priority to visit these clinics to determine their capacity and what activities they are undertaking. Based on the findings of these visits, UNDP, TMAC and other relevant partners should decide whether to provide support to these clinics and, if so, what form it should take.
  - Psycho-social support is being provided to mine/ERW victims though summer camps. There seem to be 25 places per year provided by the summer camps and it is unclear whether additional psycho-social support is available to reach the 80 survivors per year as envisaged by STMAP. Lack of funding has meant that one rather than the two planned camps have been held per year. STMAP states that psycho-social support should be effective but is not clear how/whether the 'effectiveness' of this assistance is measured.
  - Socio-economic assistance is provided to mine/ERW victims and their families however, it seems that the target 80% of victims has not been met. However, there is a lack of clarity in the way this information is reported and it is unclear whether the target is 80% annually or over the period of STMAP. These points should be clarified. According to TMAC reports, the type of socio-economic support seems to be limited and it would be worth exploring more widely among the development community to see whether there are other opportunities.
  - There is awareness among actors that access to assistance should be provided equally to all groups although it is unclear what happens in practice. The situation should be checked.
  - TMAC IMSMA and VA officers have agreed what information should be entered into the database regarding victims and victim assistance. The VA officer has collected and compiled the necessary information and it is understood that entering it into the database is a priority for the IMSMA officer.
  - In accordance with STMAP, several advocacy events have been organized to raise awareness about CRPD and CCM. To date Tajikistan is not a state party to CRPD or CCM.
4. Mine risk education is provided to all mine-affected communities and groups.
- SALW messages have been integrated into MRE in areas where it is considered that SALW might pose a threat. However, it is unclear whether there have been any assessments to determine the extent of any SALW problem. If no data exists, it is not possible to develop effective and correctly targeted SALW messages. If SALW are believed to pose a potential threat then a study should be conducted to provide insight into the issue.
  - A KAP survey was conducted in 2010 although it is unclear whether these findings have been integrated into MRE, however, it is assumed that they will be used to informed the development of an action plan for MRE that was ongoing in December 2011.

- There is an active network of MRE partners although, due to lack of funding, MRE is being delivered annually to just over 50% of its intended beneficiaries. With such funding constraints, it is recommended that ways of mainstreaming MRE into other programmes such as disaster risk reduction education are explored.
- There has been a lack of coordination meetings for MRE at all levels in the last two years. Regular meetings should be held with all relevant actors, not just partners and those in the mine action community, to explore possibilities for mainstreaming and improving the delivery of MRE.
- The IMSMA and MRE officer are collaborating to collect and enter MRE into the IMSMA database so that it informs the mine action programme.

## **4. Analysis: Roadmap for the Future of TMAC**

This chapter suggests a roadmap for the future of TMAC.

The main recommendation is to employ an international programme manager to assert TMAC's position as the lead mine action organization, maximize the potential of TMAC staff and their expertise, streamline TMAC activities, improve working relationships and collaboration with international actors, develop a plan for completing clearance of contaminated land as quickly as possible, and implement an exit strategy.

### **Situation Analysis**

As already noted, the status of TMAC is ambiguous, as it is neither a government body nor a UNDP programme. This is problematic because:

- TMAC does not have legitimate authority, and is able to operate as a 'quasigovernmental' authority only because there is good will and staff members have established working relationships
- Working relationships and divisions of responsibilities between UNDP and TMAC are difficult to define
- Some donors willing to support a national MA authority cannot fund TMAC or its operations because it is not a national agency

In addition there are personal and political tensions among several of the national and international actors involved in mine action that are impeding progress on various aspects of the mine action operations and the development of a new strategy.

TMAC operates in a country facing numerous development challenges, of which the mine/ERW contamination is a relatively small challenge with a finite lifespan. The GoT lacks the resources to fund services for its population and the capacity within government bodies at all levels is stretch in terms of resources and expertise.

As the known contaminated areas are relatively small and likely to be cleared within the next four years, mine action activities should be designed to complete clearance as quickly as possible. There is no need to scale-up activities significantly or plan mine action in the long-term - the mine action response should be commensurate with the known threat. However, there is a need to ensure that all aspects of mine action are implemented effectively and efficiently until the known threat is cleared. Therefore the mine action needs of Tajikistan should be carefully monitored and the development of an exit strategy should be considered. The exit strategy should include a plan to provide the Tajik authorities with the capacity to undertake mine and ERW clearance of any residual threat and the capacity to deliver MRE on a regular basis to people living in areas which may have a residual level of contamination. The possibility of mainstreaming MRE into DRR education for the long-term should be examined. Assistance to mine victims should be mainstreamed into other programmes aimed at providing physical rehabilitation and socio-economic support to the disabled and their families.

### **Rationale for Appointing an International Programme Manager**

- An international programme manager has more freedom than a national to operate independently of the political and social dynamics of Tajikistan.
- The profile among the international community would be raised.
- TMAC would benefit from new vision, capacity building and external expertise. Resources mobilization would be improved.

- The overall cost of TMAC could be reduced through the introduction of more efficient and effective processes, mainstreaming of activities into other initiatives, and exploring the possibility of working towards an earlier completion date.
- It is unclear to some observers how TMAC operates and significant improvements are possible with relatively few changes. For example, coordination and outreach could be improved through regular meetings with organizations involved in mine action and organizations operating in mine and ERW contaminated areas.
- Explore the possibility of appointing a programme manager who, after an initial six month period, has a contractual responsibility to generate funding to cover the costs of the position.

The international programme manager would be responsible for:

- Defining the status of TMAC.
- Raising the profile of TMAC, particularly among the international community, and mobilizing the additional resources available for mine action.
- Reviewing the role and responsibilities of TMAC staff members. Currently, some areas seemed to be overstaff and others understaffed.
- Strengthening TMAC's coordination role with all mine action actors.
- Ensuring TMAC is the lead mine action actor to avoid confusion over roles and responsibilities among mine action actors, fracturing mine action activities and donor funding.
- Ensuring that TMAC focuses on monitoring and coordination and is not involved in implementation.
- Mainstreaming mine action into other socio-economic and disaster risk reduction activities
- More effective resource mobilization to securing funding for TMAC to operate in a monitoring and coordination role.
- Reviewing, developing or strengthening existing agreements and SOPs to work with clearance, MRE and VA organizations.
- Developing an exit strategy in consultation with GoT, mine action actors and their key stakeholders.

### **TMAC Status**

The advantages and disadvantages of each end status for TMAC should be carefully examined. However, senior level government officials would have to be consulted on TMAC's status and it is assumed that any change to its status would have to be agreed by the President. The main goal of TMAC is to fulfil the GoT's commitments to the MBT, so its status should enable it to do that effectively. The effect of each status on TMAC's ability to function and the potential impact of change from one status to another should be carefully considered.

### *Nationalizing TMAC*

- According to the STMAP, TMAC should be nationalized, despite efforts by UNDP and TMAC, there has been no significant progress towards nationalization.
- Mine action centres in other countries with functioning governments are national entities
- The GoT needs to demonstrate its commitment to mine action.
- Signing the MBT and providing contributions in kind are not significant enough contributions to demonstrate to the international community that the GoT is fully committed to the MBT. National development strategies do not address the issue of mine/ERW contamination.
- Some donors would find it easier to fund a mine action agency that is nationalized than one with an ambiguous status.

- The final status of TMAC should enable the organization to make independent decisions about its activities or obtain the necessary authority to act. For example, it needs to have a mandate that enables it to work effectively with other ministries including the Ministry of Defence.
- Existing TMAC staff capacities should be assessed. Those with the necessary skills to operate in TMAC post-nationalization should be retained and offered salaries and conditions to match current UNDP salaries and conditions.
- It is imperative that following nationalization TMAC retains staff that can contribute to it as a nationalized organization. Current TMAC staff members are well-known among partner organizations and have skills that are difficult to replace.
- The power dynamics between the different mine action actors are unclear, redefining TMAC's status would create a situation allowing exiting relationships/agreements to be revised and TMAC to assert its authority over mine action operations in Tajikistan.
- Nationalization would facilitate the development of an exit strategy because it would involve scaling down many operations rather than a shifting roles and responsibilities from one agency to another/others.

There are costs in time and effort in pursuing a nationalization agenda:

- Negotiations with the GoT to nationalize TMAC could be lengthy and time consuming and detract from TMAC's operations.
- There is a risk that nationalizing TMAC would have a negative impact on mine action activities while the nationalization process takes place and after it is completed.
- A nationalized TMAC may be subject to Tajikistan bureaucracy or lose control of resources so the process of nationalization might result in a weaker mine action capacity.

#### *Maintaining the Status Quo or directly implementing TMAC*

- As TMAC functions and has a limited lifespan, it may be more effective for UNDP and TMAC to continue operating as they do not now
- A DEX project would define the relationship between TMAC and UNDP and give UNDP greater control of TMAC. The international programme manager would be a UNDP employee and responsible to UNDP.
- Although, in principle, maintaining the status quo or reverting to a DEX project goes against best practice, either option may yield results in mine action more efficiently and effectively and ensure that Tajikistan meets its obligations to the MBT.

However:

- As there is already level of national mine action capacity in the MoD, TMAC is more vulnerable to criticisms that it is not nationalized
- A directly implemented project or maintaining the ambiguous status quo means that TMAC continues to rely on goodwill from the GoT to operate.

#### **TMAC Status and Timescale**

The international programme manager should be responsible for determining which status is most appropriate for TMAC and developing a strategy to achieve that status. If TMAC is not nationalized, the international programme manger should implement similar activities and follow a similar timescale as outlined below.

2012

Appointment of international programme manager for TMAC

Review of TMAC staff and roles and responsibilities

Secure funding commitments from donors for a nationalized mine action centre

Explore possible outcomes for TMAC's status, consult with key stakeholders and assess the potential for an agreement with GoT for a nationalized mine action centre

2013

International programme manager heads the nationalized mine action centre

National mine action centre capacity is strengthened to coordinate and monitor all mine action activities

End of 2013 a review of the mine and ERW contamination in Tajikistan to determine dates for final clearance

2014-15

Assuming that it is agreed that clearance can be completed by the end of 2015, an exit strategy is developed for the national mine action centre which includes leaving a sustainable capacity within the GoT to respond to the residual mine action threat, provide support to mine victims through mainstreaming with support for people with disabilities, and to deliver MRE within disaster risk reduction activities.

## ANNEX 1 - TERMS OF REFERENCE

<b>Project Title:</b>	“Support to Tajikistan Mine Action Programme”
<b>Post Title:</b>	International Consultant for mid-term review of the UNDP Mine Action Program
<b>Type of contract:</b>	IC
<b>Location:</b>	Dushanbe, Tajikistan
<b>Duration:</b>	4 weeks with 2 weeks mission in Tajikistan (November 2011)
<b>Deadline:</b>	30 September 2011

### **BACKGROUND INFORMATION:**

**Mine/UXO problem:** Tajikistan’s landmines and contamination from explosive remnants of war (ERW) still remains the legacy from various past conflicts and landmines, which are mostly found along the Tajik-Afghan Border (TAB), the Tajik-Uzbek Border (TUB) and the Central Region (CR) of the country. Since 2004, joint collaborative activities of the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC) and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), identified approximately 60 sq. km of contaminated land. Demining, technical survey and land release activities resulted in substantial reduction of contaminated land surfaces. However, more than 10 sq. km of the land still remains contaminated along the TAB and CR of Tajikistan. At the same time, the mine problem in TUB cannot be properly documented or surveyed due to security reasons. Only late 2010 the discussions have revived on the mine issues in TUB and there is a hope to start some survey activities in the border areas in 2011.

**APMBC and Tajikistan Extension Request for Article 5:** Tajikistan acceded to the Ottawa Convention, also called the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), on 12.10.1999, becoming a State Party on 01.04.2000. Tajikistan complied with the MBT Article 4 obligations by destroying all AP mines stockpiles before April 2004. Tajikistan complied with the Article 7 obligations by providing annual implementation reports to the Disarmament Affairs Department of the United Nations Office in Geneva (UNOG). Tajikistan has been very active in participating in the MBT States Parties Meetings, in the intersessional meetings of the Standing Committees of the Convention as well as in the annual meetings of the Mine Action National Directors and UN Advisors. According to Article 5 of the MBT, Tajikistan has the obligation to destroy all anti-personnel mines on its territory before April 2010. As this has not been considered possible, Tajikistan prepared a detailed request for extending the deadline for completion of the Article 5 obligations. A ten-year extension request has been approved by the State Parties to the Convention during the Cartagena Summit on a Mine-Free World held in Colombia on 29.11-04.12.2009. Tajikistan is also a State Party to the Amended Protocol II and Protocol V to the CCW. Tajikistan has not yet signed or ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).

**TMAC and Partners:** The Tajikistan Mine Action Center (TMAC) was established in June 2003 by agreement between the Government of Tajikistan (GoTaj) and UNDP. TMAC represents the executive arm of the Governmental Commission on the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law, the body, which is able to plan, coordinate and implement all components of mine action programme and oversees all

aspects of the mine action programme in Tajikistan in collaboration with the mine action operators, relevant ministries, local authorities/communities and in consultation with UNDP. TMAC's national partners include the Ministries of Defence, Labour and Social Protection, Health, Education, Committee of Emergency Situation and Civil Defence, Main Department of Border Guards of the State Committee of National Security and National Guard, Committee of Women and Family Affairs, National Orthopaedic Centre, National Rehabilitation Centre, National Association of Disabled People, Society of the Disabled, the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan, Harmony of the World as well as the national mass media. Although TMAC operates under a National implementation (NIM) modality, UNDP closely monitors and controls finances, human resources, international travel and procurement related tasks of TMAC.

International cooperation is also recognized. Since 2003, Tajikistan has enjoyed a productive and dynamic cooperation with FSD that acted as the main demining operator in the country. TMAC established good cooperation with GICHD and particularly improved its information management capacity. The ICRC provides support and trainings to rehabilitate and improve the work conditions of the people with disabilities as well as actively participates in MRE activities. Late 2010 the Norwegian People Aid (NPA) Organization started its survey and demining operations in accordance with signed Agreement with the Tajikistan Government. The France Government enabled the Handicap International to undertake the KAP survey of mine risk awareness in priority districts of the country.

**Tajikistan Mine Action Strategic Plan 2010 – 2015 ("Protecting Life & Promoting Development") and UNDP "Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme" Project:** TMAC with UNDP support and active participation of all mine action stakeholders in Tajikistan developed a new Country Strategy for Mine Action for 2010-2015. This Strategy goes in line with priorities of the country and particularly follows the goals of the National Development Strategy and Poverty Reduction Strategy of the Government of Tajikistan. The vision of the Strategy corresponds to the priority of the country – being free of the landmines threat and ERWs, ensuring that (i) the Government of Tajikistan is in a position to comply with its international obligations related to landmines and Explosive Remnants of War, (ii) all priority areas will be cleared by the end of 2015, (iii) the national mine action programme efficiently supports the poverty reduction and socio-economic development strategy of the Government.

Based on the Strategy vision and goals UNDP has developed its Project Document on "Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme", which aims at promoting the principles of the national ownership, institutional and technical capacity building as well as corresponds to key requirements of the International Mine Action Standards. This Project Document draws a comprehensive roadmap on building on the existing momentum and developing further existing capacity to ensure that Tajikistan complies with its obligations under Ottawa Convention and its protocols. The **specific objectives** of the project are articulated around the main components of the mine action programme: 1) Support the capacity of Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC) to coordinate, regulate, plan and monitor all mine action activities in the country; 2) Strengthening the demining operations of the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme; 2) Making change into the mine/ERW victims' life; 4) Building safe environment for the communities through Mine Risk Education.

**Need for the STAMP evaluation:** Since the launch of the Mine Action Programme in Tajikistan in 2003, the evaluation of the project was conducted by an independent



international consultant in 2009. The main findings of the evaluation included: (i) The status of TMAC should be clarified either as a „directly executed“ (DEX) project or “national executed” (NEX) and its lifespan can be limited to the length of the landmine clearance project which is estimated (by the Consultant) at 10 years at current planning levels; (ii) The UXO contamination should be dealt with by a sustainable capacity within the Committee for Emergency Situation and Civil Defence (CESCD) established by a train and equip project with recurrent operational costs then being met by the government; (iii) The landmine problem in Tajikistan can further be broken down into areas that have socio-economic impact and those that don't have such an effect. A suggestion was also made to re-evaluate the Mine Risk Education (MRE) Programme to establish just how much effort should be made and the relative effort spent in either mass communication techniques or community-based approaches. More details on the evaluation findings can be found in the separate report.

Based on the evaluation findings, the TMAC prepared the Management Response Plan in order to address the findings and proposed recommendations. Since 2009 the capacity of the Programme significantly increased. In 2010 the programme was enabled to establish 7 Multipurpose Demining Teams, 3 Non-Technical Survey Teams, 5 Mine Detection Dogs sets and 2 Mechanical demining teams within FSD, 1 mechanical demining team within Ministry of Defence and 3 Multipurpose Demining Teams within Norwegian People Aid (NPA) Organization. Increased potential and experience of TMAC led to strengthening the development of the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Rapid Response intervention capacities under the Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence (CoES). In addition, through the governmental sponsorship of the USA, Canada and Japan together with the Government of Germany and OSCE, it was provided with 3 mechanical demining machines. At the same time, more than 1,8 sq. km of land has been cleared and more than 0,6 sq. km processed by mechanical demining machines with 2081 anti-personnel mines (APM), 3 anti-vehicle mines (AVM) and 705 UXOs and more than 16,731 small ammunition and cartridges have been found and destroyed. After successful Quality Control (QC), 15 cleared areas with the total amount of 1,600,907 sq. m were handed over to local authorities, benefiting more than 25 thousand people. To assure the quality of the demining activities undertaken, the team already re-surveyed 483 villages within 60 communities. It is expected to conduct around 2,000,000 sq. m of land during 2011 operation year. Visible progress is also achieved on the Victim Assistance (VA) and MRE components.

Several steps and actions were taken on the Programme nationalization process. Different consultations and meetings were organized with TMAC staff, partner's agencies and Ministry of Justice representatives regarding the establishment of TMAC as a legal national entity responsible for managing the mine action programme during 2010. UNDP TMAC recruited an Expert-Lower for preparation of the legal documentations. TMAC Regulations on national/status has been prepared and submitted to the relevant ministries and agencies for their recommendations. Recommendations were made and the national status was revised accordingly. Once the Regulations and other relevant papers were finalized, the issue was discussed with the first Deputy of the Prime Minister and relevant line ministries and agencies. The

documents were submitted to President Office for approval and signing. It is expected that the issue of TMAC nationalization will be finalized by the end of 2011. Taking into consideration the progress and still existing challenges in the mine action field, UNDP intends to involve an external independent consultant to conduct the mid-term evaluation of the Mine Action Program. The purpose of the mid-term review is to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of activities carried out during 2009-2011 in relation to the stated objectives, assess the progress with follow up the recommendations of previous evaluation and reviews and to produce plausible recommendations on the further programme implementation and UNDP partnership with the Government.

### **DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES:**

Under the guidance of the UNDP Tajikistan's Program unit the Consultant will conduct mid-term review of the UNDP Support to Mine Action Programme (STMAP) for the period from 2009-2011 in line with the objectives of the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) 2010-2015, Outcome # 5 "Government is able to plan, coordinate and implement comprehensive mine action". S/He will evaluate progress against the set goals and priorities as well as to assess how mine action activities contribute to the strategic goals of UNDP and the Government. The scope of the consultancy shall include the following components of the mine action programme in Tajikistan and include recommendations for improvement or changes for the future:

1. Review the progress of STMAP in terms of project targets achievements and assess feasibility of the project towards achievement of the UNDAF and CPAP strategic goals and outcomes for 2010-2015, as well as relevance of UNDP initiatives in mine action to the National strategy for mine action for 2010-2015.
2. Assess the progress of UNDP and TMAC in following up recommendations of previous outcome evaluation with regards to appropriate management and implementation of mine action program. Conduct SWOT analysis on the existing working modalities between UNDP and TMAC and make appropriate recommendations for improvement given the current circumstances and changes happened in mine action scene in the last three years.
3. Review effectiveness of resource mobilization and partnership strategies implemented by UNDP and TMAC for all mine action pillars during the period 2009-2011.
4. Review the existing capacities of the Tajik Mine Action Center to oversee all aspects of mine action programme in Tajikistan and its perceived role to represent the programme in all relevant national and international events. Review TMAC's organizational structure and capacity of TMAC staff to implement relevant tasks in coordination, planning and monitoring mine action activities.
5. Review and assess the TMAC's applied methodology and practices for coordination, regulation, planning and monitoring of mine action pillars in the country, including review of national mine action standards and their compliance to international best practices, assessment of applied planning and prioritisation mechanism for demining activities, effectiveness of the information management and capabilities of TMAC to develop integration processes of mine action with broader development initiatives.

6. Review the commitment of the Government of Tajikistan in addressing its mine action problems and make recommendation to UNDP Tajikistan to pursue with the Government for increased ownership and/or contribution to mine action. Outline the potential role and capacities of the Government and its institutions in taking over the responsibility for mine and ERW action given the present and foreseeable economic and political conditions of the country.
7. Provide recommendations for improvements and /or amendments in the UNDP strategic positioning with regards to mine action and develop a structured roadmap to define TMAC status vis a vis UNDP, specifically addressing the issue of nationalization and conversion to full national implementation status in the future.

#### **List of deliverables and timelines**

Deliverable	Deadline
Deliverable 1: Submission of the Draft of the Mid-term review report with findings and recommendations.	Within 21 days of completing his/her visit to Tajikistan
Deliverable 2: Submission of the Final Report of the Mid-term review report with findings and recommendations.	Within 10 working days after receiving UNDP's comments on the first draft

#### **REQUIRED SKILLS, EXPERIENCE AND TECHNICAL EXPERTISE**

- Master's Degree or equivalent in International Relations, Political Science, Economics or related social sciences;
- Substantive experience with development projects implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and conducting program evaluations is required;
- Previous experience and policy and technical knowledge of mine action programmes is crucial;
- Good technical skills in measurement and evaluation, including grasp of methodological and operational dimensions and the ability to link corporate and country level issues;
- Good interpersonal, consultation, communication, facilitation and presentation skills;
- Excellent written skills, including report writing; and
- Fluency in English language both written and spoken is required; knowledge of Russian would be an asset.

## **Annex 2: Document Review**

The key documents reviewed as part of this evaluation Include:

Country Programme Action Plan between the Government of Tajikistan and the United Nations Development Programme 2010-2015

Davlytova Shahrinisso (2011) Annual Report, Mine Risk Education, TMAC (draft)

FSD annual reports and work plans

International Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Munition Coalition (2011) Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor: Tajikistan, Washington DC: Human Rights watch

Handicap International (2010) Mine/ERW Risk Education in Tajikistan: Baseline Information from Three Districts in Sughd Region 2010 KAP Survey Results

Keeley Robert (2009) Outcome Evaluation for Mine Action Programme UNDP Tajikistan, RK Consulting Ltd

Muminova Reykhan (2010) Annual Report, Victim Assistance, TMAC (draft)

Muminova Reykhan (2011) Annual Report, Victim Assistance, TMAC (draft)

NPA Annual reports and work plans

Republic of Tajikistan (2010) Tajikistan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2010-2015: Protecting Life and Promoting development

Roughley Anne (2010) IA Report: Tajikistan, NPA

UNICEF (2007) Tajikistan Mine Risk Education Final Report

UNICEF (2007) Evaluation MRE Pilot Project UNICEF Tajikistan

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Support to Tajikistan Mine Action Programme

### Annex 3: List of Meetings and Visits

Date	Organization
Thursday 1 December	TMAC
Friday 2 December	TMAC and RSCT MRE team
	ICRC
	RSCT, Disaster Management
	Ministry of Education
	UNDP Country Office Senior Management and Mine Action Focal Point
	FSD
Saturday 3 December	UNDP Mine Action Focal Point
Sunday 4 December	Field visit to Isfara District of Soghd Region and meetings with partners
Monday 5 December	
Tuesday 6 December	Handicap International
	TMAC
Wednesday 7 December	Mercy Corps
	CoES
	Department of Border Guards
	OSCE
Thursday 8 December	TMAC
	CHIIL
	Mission East
	Ministry of Labour and Social Protection
	Orthopedic Centre
	Meeting with the National Association of Disabled People
	Handicap International
Friday 9 December	Ministry of Health
	ICBL
	Destiny (VA NGO)
	Union of Sappers Tajikistan
	Mass Media
	Committee of Women and Family Affairs
	UNICEF
	Border Management Northern Afghanistan
	Handicap International
Saturday 10 December	Visit to operations sites, Khatlon Region
Sunday 11 December	
Monday 12 December	MOD
Tuesday 13 December	TMAC validation workshop
	GIS
	Japanese Embassy
Wednesday 14 December	VA officer
	French Embassy
	UNDP Country Office
	German Embassy